







DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS  




Abstract Asymmetric climate policies are expected to distort the level-playing ﬁeld
regarding international trade, singularly to the detriment of small open economies.
The paper develops a ﬂexible method that provides essential input regarding the
design of oﬀsetting measures at the sectoral level. It builds on input-output analysis
and standard input-output data to provide proxies for both the carbon-intensity
and the trade-intensity of production. These are used to reckon the impact that
such policies as carbon taxation have on the price-competitiveness of sectors. The
method is then applied to the case of Belgium.
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11 Introduction
Mitigating global warming and moving towards a low-carbon economy is now widely
recognized as a crucial challenge. Since the early nineties, international negotiations
regarding greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions reduction took place under the aus-
pices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
and the various agreements that ensued, mainly the Kyoto Protocol. They rest on
a number of principles, amongst which the idea that countries share common but
diﬀerentiated responsibilities as for causing climate change. It implies that those
countries which beneﬁted the most from carbon-intensive development must be the
ﬁrst to take measures aimed at cutting down emissions, whereas less advanced coun-
tries are allowed to delay such actions until they reach a certain level of development.
However fair it is, this principle brings up several cost and competitiveness-related
issues. Adapting productions structures in order to decrease emissions brings along
costs that would otherwise not be supported. It obviously distorts the level-playing
ﬁeld regarding international trade, as those countries facing emissions constraints
undergo cost increases while the others do not. In other words, asymmetric climate
policies raise the issue of the international price-competitiveness of the economies
that implement domestic environmental instruments to curb emissions (‘carbon-
constrained economies’ hereafter). Their transition towards a low-carbon economy is
potentially costly in the short run in terms of market share. This in turn weakens the
support for a global agreement, as countries are reluctant to penalize their domestic
economy if others do not participate in global agreements or free-ride –a phenomenon
known as the ‘regulatory chill’. The fear is that sectors of which the cost structure is
aﬀected engage in global arbitrage and relocate production in non-constrained areas,
which might lead to carbon leakage and jeopardizes the environmental eﬃciency of
global agreements. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sur-
veyed the related literature extensively in its fourth assessment report (Barker et al.,
2007).
Obviously, not all countries and sectors will be aﬀected in the same way by
emissions constraints. Two dimensions should be considered. First, the impact
2depends on the extend to which producers are (not) able to pass cost increases into
production prices. Second, the cost increase experienced by a productive sector
depends on the total emissions that were caused by the production of its output,
not only directly, but also indirectly by the production of intermediate inputs. That
is, the impact of relatively stringent domestic climate policies on competitiveness
depends on both the trade-intensity and the carbon-intensity of production. The
rest of the section goes through these two dimensions in more detail.
The ﬁrst one regards the ability of producers to shift forward to consumers the
costs caused by the climate policy. Price-taking ﬁrms that evolve in a competitive,
trade-exposed environment are unlikely to be able to do that. More generally, the
competitiveness concern is particularly striking for small open economies (SOEs), as
they are typically price-taker and very much exposed to international trade. The
existing contrast between large economies and SOEs is emphasized in Table 1; for
instance, while 8.3 per cent of total American CO2 discharge is actually used for
producing exports, this ﬁgure amounts to 45.5 per cent in the Belgian case (Peters
and Hertwich, 2008).
Table 1: CO2 emissions embodied in trade for selected countriesa.
Country Imports Exports
%%
Russian Federation 5.9 27.5
China 6.6 24.4
United States 15.6 8.3
Slovenia 44.8 40.1
The Netherlands 58.1 39.1
Ireland 66.6 49.1
Belgium 89.4 45.5
a Percentage of total emissions, year 2001.
Source: Peters and Hertwich (2008).
The issue of international competitiveness loss due to asymmetric climate policies
is problematic from both an environmental and an economic standpoint, the latter
being singularly true in SOEs. Therefore, the design of measures aimed at oﬀset-
ting the competitiveness impact of such policies like carbon taxes or cap-and-trade
received considerable attention in the literature. Two main options are considered.
3The ﬁrst one regards the method used for the allocation of tradable emission al-
lowances, which can be designed so as to alleviate carbon costs; Grubb and Neuhoﬀ
(2006) provide an overview. The second is related to the vast literature on border
tax adjustment. Recent theoretical contributions include Ismer and Neuhoﬀ (2007)
and McCorriston and Sheldon (2005), while practical implementation is examined,
amongst others, by Monjon and Quirion (2010)a n dBrewer and van Asselt (2010).
Oﬀsetting measures implementation typically requires the quantitative appraisal
of competitiveness impact. The IPCC fourth assessment report surveyed the liter-
ature on the impact of CO2 emissions constraints on competitiveness. It concludes
that competitiveness losses are not signiﬁcant but also that the evidence is limited
and there is no full agreement on the conclusion (Barker et al., 2007). However, there
exists a major shortcoming in the literature: this overall limited impact hides impor-
tant heterogeneity across sectors that is not satisfactorily reckoned in. As stressed
in a meta-analysis focused on the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU
ETS) by Oberndorfer and Rennings (2007), general equilibrium models do not allow
for high sectoral disaggregation, while sector-level analyses (e.g. Smale et al., 2006)
are limited by their partial equilibrium nature. More recently, empirical research
on the impact of climate policies on competitiveness has been conducted as data
become available. It typically uses gravity models and ﬁnds no signiﬁcant evidence
of negative impact, as in the recent contribution by Kee et al. (2010). Again, the
heterogeneity issue is not addressed. There is actually a surprising lack of research
at the sectoral level. Moreover, current research rests on existing climate policy mea-
sures, that are not enough to reach UNFCCC objectives in terms of global warming
stabilization. It should be noted that most policy-oriented projections on compet-
itiveness impact do not build on suﬃciently restrictive measures either (Zhang and
Baranzini, 2004).
This paper develops a method that allows to ﬁll those gaps. It focuses on carbon
taxation. This is a Pigovian tax, that is, a tax aimed at adjusting for the carbon
dioxide externality by distorting relative prices to encourage ﬁrms and consumers to
substitute away from carbon-intensive products, and therefore cut down emissions.
4CO2 discharge is estimated at the sectoral level. The ﬂat carbon tax is levied on
emissions. The tax level is set so that climate policy targets are met, that is, it is set
at the equilibrium marginal cost of abating emissions that is required to fulﬁll the
reduction objective. The tax burden raises sectors production costs. Depending on
the sectors ability to shift it forward to consumers, this will cause either an increase
in ﬁnal prices or a drop in operating margins. Sectors aptitude to pass on the
cost increase is approximated by the trade-intensity of their production, as reﬂected
by their imports from and exports towards non-constrained economies. Although
imperfect, this proxy is convenient as it only requires standard System of National
Accounts (SNA) data.
The purpose is to provide a competitiveness assessment that enables to quan-
titatively distinguish between sectors. Indeed, as stressed above, not all of them
would experience the same increase in production costs, nor would they undergo the
same loss of competitiveness for a given increase. This distinction between sectors is
crucial, because negotiations regarding emissions reduction policies and the design of
oﬀsetting measures are notably lobbied by industrial federations that are expected to
bear a disproportionate burden that potentially harms their operating margins. This
calls for rigorous impact analysis at the sectoral level in order to prevent some indus-
tries from making windfall gains because of too favorable oﬀsetting measures. This
paper is a modest contribution towards the accurate and unbiased estimation of the
relative impact of climate policies on the competitiveness of the diﬀerent economic
sectors.
It should be clear that the competitiveness concern arises in the short term,
due to limited substitution possibilities in the production structure. In the longer
run however, technological progress, the evolution of industrial structure and other
structural changes cause adjustment. Concerns underlying the short-run impact of
carbon taxation regard the potential repercussions on the immediate economic and
social situation in the domestic economy, namely troubles with ﬁrms survival and
their unemployment consequences with potential hysteresis.
The second dimension to be considered is carbon-intensity, which is closely re-
5lated to energy-intensity. The short-run price-eﬀects are determined by the use of
inputs that lead to GHG emissions at any time during the production process. Es-
timating total CO2 emissions all along the production chain (‘embodied emissions’
hereafter) is key in the competitiveness appraisal. Indeed, an educated guess might
be suﬃcient to designate heavy industries of which the production costs are likely
to be aﬀected, e.g. steel industries or the electric power generation sector. However,
in a world where all carbon emissions are priced, any ﬁnal product that caused CO2
discharge somewhere in the production chain becomes costlier. Take for instance
aluminum window frames. The production of the aluminum they contain requires
important quantities of electric power, of which the cost is expected to increase be-
cause the marginal production of electricity uses natural gas, which is a source of
CO2 emissions. Window frames production costs would then increase in such situa-
tion, which is potentially problematic if domestic frame producers face international
competition from non-constrained economies. Taking the whole production structure
into account is thus critical.
Input-output (IO) analysis is the prominent tool in the literature to investigate
questions related to the production structure at the sectoral level. Initiated by
Leontief (1936), IO techniques typically model production in a general equilibrium
framework at a relatively high level of sectoral disaggregation by relating total, direct
and indirect sectoral output to ﬁnal demand through interindustry relationships. Its
analytical power has been used for numerous economic research, and notably taxation
impact and energy or environment-related questions; for seminal contributions, see
Aaron (1968)a n dAyres and Kneese (1969), respectively. Recently, global warming
concern and the perspective of emissions constraints led to a revival of IO modelling
to investigate emissions-related issues. Minx et al. (2009) provide an overview of the
growing literature on the topic. They emphasize the methodological pre-eminence
of IO analysis for the purpose of estimating embodied emissions.
The very large majority of research regards the environmental consequences of
international trade. Speciﬁcally, it computes indicators such as carbon footprint
of nations (e.g. Hertwich and Peters, 2009) or environmental balance of trade and
6related carbon leakage (e.g. Wilting and Vringer, 2009). It rests on generalized IO
models, that is, IO models extended with data on production-related ﬂows (‘social
accounting matrix’), in this case GHG emissions. This approach requires important
data on energy use and emissions for both the industry and households that may
be diﬃcult to treat, if available. This is a drawback, as it makes such research
less easy. Therefore, the method developed here goes beyond this drawback by
only calling for standard SNA IO tables in monetary value, making it more ﬂexible.
Physical quantities are derived with a price vector and embodied CO2 is inferred with
emissions coeﬃcients. From a methodological standpoint, the approach by Creedy
and Sleeman (2006) is the closest to what is done here. Their purpose is however
essentially diﬀerent since they use their estimates of carbon embodiment to examine
the distributive impact of a carbon tax on household welfare.
Finally, it should be mentioned that two diﬀerent types of IO models are used
in the literature: the single-region model, which assumes the same production struc-
ture for domestic products and imports (e.g. Peters and Hertwich, 2008), and the
multi-region model, which overcomes the single-region assumption, as in Wilting and
Vringer (2009). The method developed here builds on the single-region assumption.
Although restrictive1, it has the advantage of easiness and ﬂexibility regarding data
collection and treatment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 exposes the basic method. An
application to the case of Belgium is presented in Section 3. Section 4 eventually
concludes.
2 The basic method
2.1 Production
The method builds on the standard IO quantity model as exposed in Miller and Blair
(2009, chap. 2). Consider an economy with n productive sectors. The gross output
of each sector is allocated between the intermediate demand by sectors that use it
as inputs and the ﬁnal demand, which consists in private and public consumption,
1The single-region assumption and its implications are discussed in Section 4.
7investments and exports. Let xd
ij be the the value of domestic output ﬂowing from
sector i to sector j and yi the value of the ﬁnal demand of output from domestic
sector i. The value of the gross output of each domestic sector can be written as the






ij + yi (1)
Assume that intermediate inputs are not substitutable, as admissible in the short
term. That is, there exist short-run ﬁxed linear interdependencies between sectors,
implying that sectors use intermediate inputs xd
ij in ﬁxed proportion2. Therefore, the




j. Each technical coeﬃcient ad
ij represents the value of output of sector i
that is directly required to produce one unit worth of output of sector j.T h eo u t p u t







j + yi (2)
The economy therefore consists in n production structures described by Eq. 2.
With xd and y denoting the n-vector of xd
i and yi, respectively, and Ad being the n-
square matrix of technical coeﬃcients ad
ij, the system of n equations can be rewritten
in matrix form:
xd = Adxd + y (3)






where I denotes the unit matrix and
￿
I − Ad￿−1 is the well-known Leontief inverse,
of which each element li,j indicates the total, direct and indirect value of domestic
production of sector i that is required in the economy as a whole to satisfy one unit
worth of ﬁnal demand for output of sector j. The inverse thus captures linkages
between sectors3.
2The associated production function –the so-called Leontief technology– is nothing else than
a particular case of the CES production function where factors are perfect complements. This
assumption is discussed in Section 4.
3The successive linkages clearly appear if one recalls that, since the matrix norm of A
d






+ ... where the successive terms are the multiplier eﬀects of ﬁnal demand on
production.
8Imports are taken into account just as intermediate production. In an exact
analogy with Ad, let Am denote the n-square matrix of imports coeﬃcients. Total
requirements in both domestic production and imports can be expressed as





Note eventually that, for each sector as a consumer, it is possible to break down
total requirements over each sector as a producer. It only takes the slight rearrange-
ment of Eq. 5 with ﬁnal demand expressed as diagonal matrix (indicated by a hat)
rather than as a vector:





2.2 Carbon-intensity and price-eﬀects
Under the somewhat restrictive assumption that all sectors face homogenous inter-
mediate and imports prices (Weisz and Duchin, 2006), physical quantities can readily
be derived from monetary IO data by dividing the monetary value of output by its
price. Let pd and pm be the domestic and imports price vector, respectively. Then
total required quantities for each consuming sector broken down by producing sectors
is obtained by dividing the value of domestic intermediates and the value of imports
in Eq. 6 by the corresponding price vector:
Q =
￿





The total CO2 emissions embodied in sectors output all along the production
chain can now be inferred thanks to carbon dioxide emissions coeﬃcients. Let ￿ be
a n-vector that takes the suitable emission coeﬃcient value for primary fossil energy
sectors and zero otherwise. Pre-multiplying Eq. 7 by the transpose of the emissions
coeﬃcients vector gives the vector of embodied emissions by sectors:
e￿ = ￿￿Q = ￿￿
￿





A carbon tax τ is levied on every emission of carbon dioxide. Suppose that the
tax is fully passed on in the output price4. This is a common assumption for cost-
4This usual, although very questionable assumption is discussed in Section 4.
9push analysis in the IO literature (ten Raa, 2005, chap. 3). Therefore, the total cost










2.3 Trade-intensity and competitiveness
Consider a number of foreign economies indexed by z. Some are carbon-constrained
(C) while others are not (NC). Two proxies are used for reckoning the trade-intensity
of sectors. The ﬁrst is the proportion of the total output of a sector that is exported
towards non-constrained economies, that is, a proxy of exports competitiveness. The
second is a proxy of the vulnerability to imports and is deﬁned as the amount of
imports of a product coming from non-constrained economies relative to the total
domestic production of that product. Let xiz denote the exports ﬂow from domestic
sector i to zone z. Let also mijz be the imports ﬂow of type i from zone z towards















z mijz + xd
ij
￿ (11)
Finally, competitiveness is assessed by examining trade exposure together with
price eﬀects. Formally, it consists in arbitrarily determining critical values for exports
and imports exposure, ¯ ξ and ¯ µ, as well as for the price eﬀects, dpd/pd, that deﬁne a










pd ∩ ξi ≥ ¯ ξ ∩ µi ≥ ¯ µ
￿
(12)
3 Application: the case of Belgium
3.1 Data
The SNA quinquennial I-O table used for this application was compiled by the Bel-
gian Federal Planning Bureau (FPB). It describes the Belgian economy in 2000
10and has the 143 × 143 format5,6. Interindustry ﬂows are expressed in monetary
value. Sectors are identiﬁed with FPB codes, which roughly correspond to NACE-
Bel rev.1.1.
Note Belgium’s position regarding primary fossil energy is particular as it has
no fossil fuel resources and all the primary fossil energy is imported. The products
considered for fossil energy imports are coal and lignite, coke, crude petrol, natural
gas and reﬁned petroleum products. The energy price vector and the emissions
coeﬃcients are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Energy price and emissions coeﬃcient vectors.




Crude petrol 5.23 73.3
Natural gas 4.31 56.1
Reﬁned petroleum products 5.95 74.5
Sources: IEA and IPCC.
The carbon tax level is such that the objectives set by the European Union
(EU) in its energy and climate package are met. This climate policy consists in an
independent commitment by the EU to a twenty per cent cut of its emissions by 2020
compared to 1990 levels, as well as to a twenty per cent share of renewable energy in
gross ﬁnal energy demand and a twenty per cent improvement of energy eﬃciency.
The corresponding tax level has been computed by the PRIMES energy model and
amounts to EUR 33.5/tCO2 (Bossier et al., 2008).
Finally, the method has been improved to better ﬁt the Belgian context. Belgium
is a net electric power-importing country. As imported electricity comes from France
and Germany, the constraint on emissions puts up its price7. This increase has been
estimated by FPB. It is taken into account in the estimation of the cost increase
5This table is used by courtesy of the Federal Planning Bureau. It is not published owing to
data conﬁdentiality. The oﬃcial release by the Institute for National Accounts (2004)h a st h e6 0×
60 format.
6However, data treatment led to some re-aggregation. The ﬁnal results have a disaggregation
level of 121 sectors.
7Indeed imported electric power is by deﬁnition the marginal production of the exporting country.
For technical reasons, marginal production comes from plants using the combined gas-and-steam
technology and therefore causes CO2 discharge.
11faced by sectors that directly or indirectly use imported electric power as an input.
3.2 Results
First, it is worth mentioning that the total carbon emissions estimate, around 125
MtCO2, has the same order of magnitude as the corresponding year inventory by the
Belgian National Climate Commission (2007).
Full gross results are presented in Table 5 in the Appendix. The percentage cost
increases –or price eﬀects– computed from Eq. 9 are displayed in the ﬁrst column
of ﬁgures. The second and third columns contain the proxies of trade-exposure,
as calculated from Eqs. 10 and 11. Sectoral employment appears in the fourth
one. Total, direct and indirect (or ‘cumulative’) sectoral employment is computed
thanks to the Leontief inverse and reported in column ﬁve. Employment statistics
are recorded in full-time job equivalents. The last column contains data on sectoral
production as a share of gross national product.
As expected, manufacture’s production costs are the most aﬀected, with a two
and a half per cent increase on average. Transportation industries are logically also
strongly aﬀected. Construction and trade come next. Services, in general, suﬀer
less. Note that the impact on agriculture is relatively low, but it does not take into
account other GHG gases of which the emission is constrained too. Table 3 brings
together the sectors of which the production costs are the most aﬀected. Many of
these sectors take part in the EU-ETS, namely reﬁnery8, chemical, iron, steel and
mineral industries, as well as electric power generation. Other aﬀected industries
include the diﬀerent sectors of food-processing, transports, ﬁshing and building, as
well as the rubber and plastic industries.
As explained above, the costs increases should be examined together with prox-
ies for trade-intensity in order to appraise competitiveness (see Eq. 12). In this
application, all non-EU economies are considered as non-constrained, because only
8The manufacture of reﬁned petroleum products is a special case. Indeed the method is based
on total fossil energy embodiment, but a signiﬁcant proportion of the carbon embodied in reﬁned
petroleum products is not burnt yet, hence has not generated emissions. Therefore, the enormous
ﬁgure for that industry’s output price increase has no relevance, as the tax would most likely be
borne by the ﬁnal consumer. Nevertheless, the sector is likely to actually be aﬀected since reﬁneries
usually burn ﬁve to ten percent of reﬁned petroleum products as auto-consumption.
12Table 3: Sectors with the highest cost increase.
FPB dpd/pd
code Sector %
23A1B Manufacture of reﬁned petroleum products 22.59
23A1A Manufacture of coke products 6.16
27A1 Manuf. of basic iron and steel and ECSC ferro-alloys 4.69
62A1 Air transport 4.14
24A1 Manufacture of basic chemicals 3.83
5A1 Fishing and ﬁsh farms 3.48
40A1A Electric power generation 2.99
63A1 Travel agencies and tour operators 2.27
26C1 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 1.90
61A1 Sea and coastal water transport 1.86
13A1 Mining of metal ores 1.76
61B1 Inland water transport 1.68
14A1 Other mining and quarrying 1.58
60C1 Road freight transp.; removal op.; transp. via pipeline 1.57
50B1 Retail sale of automotive fuel 1.50
26B1 Manufacture of ceramic products 1.48
15B1 Processing and preserving of ﬁsh 1.37
24F1 Manufacture of other chemical products 1.37
26A1 Manufacture of glass and glass products 1.30
the EU committed to post-2012 emissions reduction in precise ﬁgures so far. The
sectors that combine both high trade- and carbon-intensity are displayed in Table 4.
The chosen bound values for the proxies are one per cent for the cost increase (Eq.
9) and ﬁve per cent for both the exports and imports exposure (Eqs. 10 and 11).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the bound values, but it should be
kept in mind that the result for each sector is ﬁrst and foremost to be interpreted in
relation to the results for the other sectors. Also note that the cost increase could
alternatively be reported to other available SNA sectoral data, as value added or
earnings before interest and taxes.
Table 4 shows that the price-competitiveness of steel, reﬁnery, chemical and some
other heavy non-mineral industries is badly hit, as expected and compatible with
most other studies. But this analysis also produces new and less expected results.
Food-processing and textiles are two major Belgian sectors which would be aﬀected
if the country actually implements climate policies that enable it to reach its re-
ductions objectives under the EU energy and climate package. Moreover, the anal-
13Table 4: Sectors of which the competitiveness is aﬀecteda.
Direct Cumul.
FPB empl. empl.
code Sector jobs jobs
13A1 Mining of metal ores 145 232
14A1 Other mining and quarrying 5 140 4 492
15A1 Production, processing and preserving of meat 18 099 67 997
15B1 Processing and preserving of ﬁsh 1 319 2 608
15C1 Processing and preserving of fruit & vegetables 6 159 13 572
17A1 Prep., spinning, weaving & ﬁnishing of textiles 19 267 19 842
23A1A Manufacture of coke products 54 80
23A1B Manufacture of reﬁned petroleum products 3 048 14 276
24A1 Manufacture of basic chemicals 22 719 53 182
24F1 Manufacture of other chemical products 12 652 15 493
24G1 Manufacture of man-made ﬁbres 2 027 2 579
25A1 Manufacture of rubber products 3 392 4 639
26A1 Manufacture of glass and glass products 11 222 14 047
26B1 Manufacture of ceramic products 4 766 2 534
27A1 Manuf. of basic iron, steel & ECSC ferro-alloys 21 162 38 022
29D1 Manufacture of domestic appliances 2 556 4 242
36C1 Man. mus. instr., sport goods, games, toys; misc. 3 563 2 316
45C1B Construction of water projects 4 282 4 444
60C1 Road freight transport 62 820 36 350
61A1 Sea and coastal water transport 2 124 9 008
62A1 Air transport 10 317 14 562
a Set of sectors deﬁned by dpd/pd =1 .00, ¯ ξ =5 .00 and ¯ µ =5 .00.
ysis emphasizes the contrasted situations faced by these sectors that take part to
the EU-ETS. Some of them, like cement production or power generation, are much
less aﬀected than others because they are less exposed to competition from non-
constrained economies. Eventually, cumulative employment for each sector gives an
idea of how many jobs are directly and indirectly aﬀected by the impact that emis-
sions constraints have on competitiveness. It turns out that the aﬀected sectors9
account for about three hundred thousand jobs, making up more than ﬁve percent
of Belgian GDP.
9Note that, although satisfying the exposure criterion, transportation sectors are a special case
as competitors whose headquarters are located in a non-constrained area would also face emission
taxes when operating in constrained areas. However, increased transport prices further penalize
exports, which is not accounted for here.
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The purpose of this paper has been to deal with the international price-competitiveness
issue that arises because of asymmetric climate policies. In particular, it was intended
to account for sectors heterogeneity regarding the impact of carbon taxation by es-
timating the competitiveness losses at the sectoral level. This is a crucial research
topic indeed, because the design of oﬀsetting measures aimed at leveling the interna-
tional trade playing ﬁeld typically requires to be able to distinguish between sectors.
In order to do so, a ﬂexible method has been developed. It rests on standard IO
analysis of SNA data and basically consists in deriving relevant proxies of carbon-
and trade-intensity of production in order to appraise the consequences of climate
policies on competitiveness.
Of course, the method is limited by a number of conceptual shortcomings. Not
the least, IO modeling is static by nature and singularly does not allow for quantities
response to price shocks. In particular, the tax is fully passed on into output prices
without aﬀecting demand, which is economically counterfactual. Still, this hypothe-
sis of constant inputs coeﬃcients might be closer to reality in this very case of fossil
energy because demand is inelastic in the short run due to the relative absence of
substitution possibilities. Another limit lies in the single-region assumption, because
it does not allow to take into account the production structure of the rest of the
world and thus assumes it is similar to the domestic one. In particular, imports
from non-constrained areas are expected to be more carbon-intensive. However,
what we are ultimately interested in are price eﬀects. But the very deﬁnition of
non-constrained economies implies that the prices of imports from those areas do
not increase. This makes the single-region assumption less problematic in this case.
All the same, further research is deﬁnitely needed, in particular regarding the use
of multi-regional IO models. Eventually, it should be understood that the way the
carbon tax is set, although convenient, probably overstates the sectoral cost increase
for economies where energy-eﬃciency is low. Indeed, it assumes that all emissions
are paid for and none are abated in the short term. Yet this is likely to be the case in
developed economies where industries are energy-eﬃcient and where energy demand
15is inelastic.
Despite these limitations, it is hoped this paper has demonstrated the usefulness
of the method developed here when it comes to discriminating sectors in order to
design measures aimed at oﬀsetting the price-competitiveness impact of asymmetric
climate policies in SOEs.
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Appendix
Table 5 provides the full gross results of the application to the case of Belgium.
18Table 5: Full results for Belgium.
Cost Exports Imports from Direct Cumul. Gross
FPB increase outside EU outside EU empl. empl. prod.
code Sector %% o u t p u t % o u t p u t j o b s j o b s % G D P
01A1 Agriculture and hunting 0.48 1.68 9.57 98 018 39 057 1.41
02A1 Forestry and logging 0.38 5.46 12.41 2 456 880 0.07
05A1 Fishing and ﬁsh farms 3.48 1.12 17.44 1 057 696 0.03
10A1 Mining of coal and lignite 0.24 0.27 58.01 60 44 0.00
11A1 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas – – – 0 0 0.00
12A1 Mining of uranium ores – – – 0 0 0.00
13A1 Mining of metal ores 1.76 16.76 23.77 145 232 0.00
14A1 Other mining and quarrying 1.58 28.21 21.74 5 140 4 492 0.22
15A1 Production, processing and preserving of meat 0.95 6.45 4.78 18 099 67 997 0.40
15B1 Processing and preserving of ﬁsh 1.37 4.98 17.2 1 319 2 608 0.03
15C1 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables 0.91 10.54 9.14 6 159 13 572 0.17
15D1 Manufacture of oils and fats 0.45 8.56 8.70 636 5 446 0.03
15E1 Manufacture of dairy products 0.81 7.88 11.34 6 363 24 703 0.15
15F1 Manufacture of grain mill and starch products 0.81 9.42 8.13 1 686 8 225 0.05
15G1 Manufacture of animal feeds 0.22 2.67 5.58 2 828 4 032 0.09
15H1 Manufacture of bread, pastry, biscuits and cakes 0.52 3.78 4.62 33 047 41 325 0.46
15I1 Manuf. of sugar, cocoa and chocolate; sugar confect. 0.67 9.92 6.03 6 003 12 774 0.28
15J1 Manuf. of pasta and farinaceous products; tea and coﬀee 0.46 4.46 8.96 6 843 9 629 0.21
15K1 Manufacture of beverages, except water and softs 0.56 6.36 12.21 6 075 8 263 0.30
Continued on next page
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Cost Exports Imports from Direct Cumul. Gross
FPB increase outside EU outside EU empl. empl. prod.
code Sector %% o u t p u t % o u t p u t j o b s j o b s % G D P
15L1 Production of water and softs 0.66 10.97 6.48 3 742 7 380 0.14
16A1 Manufacture of tobacco products 0.29 1.18 8.04 1 185 3 005 0.14
17A1 Preparation, spinning, weaving and ﬁnishing of textiles 0.91 18.63 13.15 19 267 19 842 0.40
17B1 Manufacture of textiles, except apparel 0.67 22.25 12.35 21 639 32 956 0.41
18A1 Manufacture of wearing apparel and fur 0.51 8.57 25.22 9 344 14 576 0.13
19A1 Manufacture of leather, luggage and footwear 0.43 12.55 29.03 2 650 2 795 0.04
20A1 Manufacture of wood and wooden products 0.40 5.14 13.33 15 135 11 056 0.31
21A1 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 0.62 7.25 18.16 16 296 17 428 0.57
22A1 Publishing of recorded media 0.35 1.99 9.97 9 727 15 797 0.38
22B1 Printing and reproducing of recorded media 0.14 1.20 2.32 26 606 7 270 0.62
23A1A Manufacture of coke products 6.16 16.36 44.56 54 80 0.00
23A1B Manufacture of reﬁned petroleum products 22.59 13.86 18.49 3 048 14 276 0.31
23A1C Processing of nuclear fuel 0.10 17.39 20.13 780 1 291 0.07
24A1 Manufacture of basic chemicals 3.83 21.80 8.32 22 719 53 182 1.90
24B1 Manufacture of pesticides and agrochemical products 0.57 17.94 4.11 1 039 3 515 0.05
24C1 Manuf. of paints, varnishes, printing ink and mastics 0.22 19.88 7.05 3 782 4 174 0.14
24D1 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals 0.32 21.08 9.47 13 296 23 400 0.79
24E1 Manufacture of soap and detergents; cosmetics 0.69 16.11 7.23 5 454 9 523 0.18
24F1 Manufacture of other chemical products 1.37 19.98 7.34 12 652 15 493 0.68
24G1 Manufacture of man-made ﬁbres 0.96 20.14 10.16 2 027 2 579 0.06
Continued on next page
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FPB increase outside EU outside EU empl. empl. prod.
code Sector %% o u t p u t % o u t p u t j o b s j o b s % G D P
25A1 Manufacture of rubber products 0.94 13.76 26.51 3 392 4 639 0.10
25B1 Manufacture of plastic products 0.69 11.46 7.04 26 730 27 960 0.73
26A1 Manufacture of glass and glass products 1.30 9.44 12.16 11 222 14 047 0.34
26B1 Manufacture of ceramic products 1.48 5.13 19.24 4 766 2 534 0.10
26C1 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 1.90 3.87 3.23 2 516 1 867 0.20
26D1 Manuf. of concrete, plaster, cement and stone products 0.43 3.29 5.21 16 125 7 650 0.38
27A1 Manuf. of basic iron and steel and ECSC ferro-alloys 4.69 12.29 13.38 21 162 38 022 0.84
27B1A Other ﬁrst processing of iron 0.84 9.68 12.53 3 981 4 691 0.17
27B1B Manufacture of non-ferrous metals 0.65 12.16 16.65 8 325 17 512 0.33
27B1C Casting of metal 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 237 0 0.07
28A1 Man. of struct. met.; forg., press., stamp. & roll form. 0.27 3.81 5.31 32 571 22 204 0.69
28B1 Treatment and coating of metal 0.00 0.00 0.03 15 552 13 0.27
28C1 Man. of cutlery, tools, gen. hardware and other 0.64 9.25 20.02 17 071 17 759 0.40
29A1 Man. of machinery for the prod. & use of mechan. power 0.32 29.28 14.44 6 805 14 073 0.38
29B1 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery 0.43 19.87 14.27 15 907 22 922 0.41
29C1 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 0.67 19.55 12.55 26 430 49 930 0.68
29D1 Manufacture of domestic appliances 1.07 14.63 18.53 2 556 4 242 0.06
30A1 Manufacture of oﬃce machinery and computers 0.42 14.28 30.58 4 746 10 892 0.23
31A1 M. elec. motors, gen. & transf., distr. & contr. app., wire 0.29 10.66 11.40 13 040 12 381 0.39
31B1 Man. of accus, prim. cells & batt., light. equip., lamps 0.44 16.26 11.42 18 234 19 229 0.50
Continued on next page
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FPB increase outside EU outside EU empl. empl. prod.
code Sector %% o u t p u t % o u t p u t j o b s j o b s % G D P
32A1 Man. of radio, television and communic. equip. & app. 0.31 27.09 14.34 11 975 26 003 0.50
33A1 Man. of medic., precis. & optic. instr.; watches & clocks 0.36 12.62 18.20 9 790 11 699 0.21
34A1 Manufacture of motor vehicle 0.33 15.66 11.70 32 822 79 309 0.96
34B1 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles 0.26 13.47 16.80 15 543 20 426 0.43
35A1A Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.27 8.56 5.08 1 007 942 0.06
35A1B Man. of railway & tramway locomotives & rolling stock 0.75 4.49 8.87 1 889 3 812 0.00
35A1C Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 0.30 26.96 13.38 7 135 9 431 0.22
35B1 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 0.82 15.10 21.46 547 775 0.01
36A1 Manufacture of furniture 0.62 18.12 9.34 22 336 27 349 0.40
36B1 Manufacture of jewelery 0.10 42.79 18.69 3 072 4 293 0.06
36C1 Man. of musical instr., sport goods, games, toys; misc. 1.18 15.44 19.10 3 563 2 316 0.08
37A1 Recycling – – – 0 0 0.00
40A1A Electric power generation 2.99 0.05 0.00 16 264 12 151 1.95
40A1B Manufacture of gas 0.29 0.22 31.74 1 799 2 299 0.41
41A1 Collection, puriﬁcation and distribution of water 0.29 0.00 0.00 6 337 3 566 0.28
45A1 Site preparation 0.27 0.49 0.20 5 383 960 0.16
45B1A Building of constructions; civil engineering 1.00 0.52 0.32 88 987 172 398 1.80
45B1B Erection of roof covering and frames 0.23 0.02 0.00 8 790 4 665 0.27
45C1A Construct. of highways, roads, airﬁelds & sport facilities 0.81 0.16 0.74 20 459 20 296 0.51
45C1B Construction of water projects 1.18 6.94 5.78 4 282 4 444 0.14
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code Sector %% o u t p u t % o u t p u t j o b s j o b s % G D P
45C1C Other construction 0.25 0.89 1.09 16 585 4 212 0.20
45D1 Building installation 0.14 0.11 0.05 49 919 20 540 1.17
45E1 Other building completion 0.28 0.13 0.04 48 587 28 318 1.06
50A1 Sale, mainten. & repair of motor vehicles & motorcycles 0.86 2.71 0.01 83 051 88 856 1.66
50B1 Retail sale of automotive fuel 1.50 0.00 0.00 7 714 11 762 0.11
51A1A Wholesale of fuel 0.71 14.00 7.29 16 118 29 656 0.74
51A1B Other wholesale 0.38 8.47 0.00 209 161 180 887 6.78
52A1 Retail trade; repair of personal and household goods 0.79 0.00 0.00 274 547 328 152 2.74
55A1 Hotels 0.52 7.13 11.64 21 159 23 473 0.47
55B1 Restaurants, bars, canteen and catering 0.58 0.78 2.75 129 352 126 297 1.37
60A1 Rail transport 0.36 1.51 1.06 33 438 25 133 0.68
60B1 Passenger land transport, taxi operation and others 1.18 0.16 0.26 27 805 19 715 0.52
60C1 Road freight transp.; removal op.; transp. via pipeline 1.57 6.83 6.94 62 820 36 350 1.46
61A1 Sea and coastal water transport 1.86 40.86 8.27 2 124 9 008 0.04
61B1 Inland water transport 1.68 12.10 1.08 2 783 977 0.04
62A1 Air transport 4.14 21.74 7.88 10 317 14 562 0.06
63A1 Travel agencies and tour operators 2.27 0.02 0.36 8 478 25 669 0.14
63B1 Cargo handling, storage, support. & aux. transp. act. 0.90 12.74 7.87 33 743 48 847 1.19
64A1 Post 0.12 5.42 1.88 53 322 12 540 0.87
64B1 Telecommunications 0.34 4.50 3.61 29 132 25 886 1.73
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code Sector %% o u t p u t % o u t p u t j o b s j o b s % G D P
65 Financial intermediation 0.17 0.67 2.15 56 532 77 718 –
66 Insurance and pension funding 0.21 1.70 2.76 27 263 46 623 1.24
67 Activities auxiliary to ﬁnancial intermediation 0.11 5.38 2.60 58 624 33 063 2.09
70 Real estate activities 0.13 0.15 0.07 14 044 35 891 10.62
71A1 Location of transport equipment 0.12 1.04 6.04 2 304 1 285 0.69
71B1 Location of machinery equipment and other 0.15 0.86 0.85 7 146 821 0.65
72A1A Hardware consult.; software supply & consult.; data act. 0.47 8.60 5.56 47 572 47 930 1.25
72A1B Maintenance and repair of computing machinery 0.10 3.47 3.07 6 367 2 459 0.32
73 Research and development 0.83 15.79 10.01 10 680 15 322 0.30
74A1 Legal, account.& audit. act.; market research & op. poll. 0.13 3.66 2.56 84 088 21 069 1.73
74B1 Business & management consult.; holdings 0.15 12.53 7.26 32 607 28 877 4.11
74C1 Architect. & engineering act. and related techn. consult. 0.18 8.64 6.42 67 707 43 333 0.80
74D1 Advertising 0.03 1.80 1.20 27 357 4 331 0.35
74E1 Labour recruitment and provision of personnel 0.00 0.59 0.74 118 061 2 085 1.52
74F1 Investigation & security act.; industr. cleaning; misc. 0.12 2.08 1.14 150 285 19 050 1.31
75 Public administration 0.51 0.00 0.00 396 090 439 604 7.79
80 Education 0.22 0.00 0.00 337 667 343 423 6.49
85 Health and social work 0.46 0.65 0.00 379 357 426 576 6.80
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar act. 0.64 0.22 0.72 9 433 5 435 0.34
91 Activities of membership org. n.e.c. 0.63 0.00 0.00 35 419 27 608 0.62
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code Sector %% o u t p u t % o u t p u t j o b s j o b s % G D P
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 0.52 1.16 3.29 55 583 67 974 1.34
93 Other service activities 1.23 0.00 0.00 59 815 50 542 0.42
95 Private households with employed persons 0.00 0.00 0.00 82 982 82 982 0.54
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